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Abstract
Purpose – This study aims to examine the unique nature of family firms by investigating the moderating
effect of chief executive officer (CEO) identity on CEO career horizon and the auditor’s client risk assessment.
Consistent with literature on family businesses, the level of CEO attachment to socio-emotional wealth (SEW)
varies among family businesses.
Design/methodology/approach – This study used a longitudinal sample of 2,063 non-financial family
firm-year observations from 2005 to 2016 listed on the Bursa Malaysia. The study used the general method of
moments (GMM), which controls for endogeneity concerns.
Findings – The results reveal that, without the moderating effect of CEO identity, the relationship between
CEO career horizon and auditor’s risk assessment is positive, which suggests that the auditor’s risk
perception of retiring CEOs is very high. However, the interaction of CEO identity reverses the relationship as
evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on the interacted terms. The finding suggests that the
auditor’s perceived risk associated with CEO career horizon is lower in family firms with CEOs affiliated to
family members or in which the CEO has an equity stake. Overall, the findings provide compelling evidence
that the extent of the CEO’s attachment to the firm’s SEW affects the auditor’s client risk assessment.
Practical implications – The findings of the study serve as an enlightenment to policymakers such as
Bursa Malaysia and Security Commission that within the family-controlled firms, differences still exist;
therefore, there might be a need for future regulatory initiative to cater for the specific need of family-
controlled firms.
Originality/value – The study contributes to prior literature by departing from the agency theory adopted
in previous studies on auditor choice in family firms under the assumption that family firms are homogenous.
Keywords CEO identity, CEO retirement, Family firms, Audit risk, Malaysia
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Family-owned businesses throughout the world play a vital role in the corporate sector.
Two-thirds of business enterprises around the globe are family-owned firms. Accordingly,
family-owned firms contribute in no small measure to the global GDP and the entire world
labour force [Credit Suisse Research Institute (CSRI), 2019]. Recently, in Asia, family firms
have witnessed unprecedented growth, and several have become renowned corporate
giants. According to the CSRI report, family-owned firms have superior financial
performance compared to non-family owned firms and tend to have a long-term focus with
high share-price return. Out of the total market capitalisation in the Asian region, 32 per cent
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family firms, and this accounts for around 49 per cent of the market capitalisation [Credit
Suisse Research Institute (CSRI), 2019]. Malaysia is currently the seventh highest ranked
country in the world in terms of the percentage of family-controlled firms [Credit Suisse
Research Institute (CSRI), 2019]. Owing to the significant contribution of family firms
globally, academic researchers have focused more attention on family-controlled firms as a
significant factor that could better explain business phenomena (De Massis et al., 2018).
Extant studies, such as Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011), on family business have established
distinguishing characteristics of family firms from other forms of business organisation. A
few studies in the audit literature have provided new insights into the relationship between
family-controlled firms and audit demand (Corten et al., 2015; Ho and Kang, 2013). However,
these studies have mainly considered privately owned family firms in the context of
voluntary audit demand and assumed family firms to be a homogenous group with less
severe agency problems. Although Corten et al. (2015) did assume heterogeneity within
family firms, the paper’s focus was still on the demand for audit service in privately held
family firms considering the role of generation. The present study extends audit demand
research by focussing on the heterogeneity within the group of publicly listed family firms
in Malaysia. More specifically, it investigates the auditor’s perceived risk in relation to the
likelihood of the chief executive officer (CEO) retiring [CEO career horizon (CH)] in family-
controlled firms distorting financial figures to favour their post-retirement benefits.
The literature on CEO CH argues that CEOs nearing retirement are less motivated to
work in the interest of shareholders (Antia et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2018). Departing CEOs
have a short investment horizon because of the incentive to increase their wealth versus the
maximisation of the firm’s wealth (Davidson et al., 2007). The retiring CEO’s actions portend
serious issues for reported earnings. According to Ali and Zhang (2015), departing CEOs
overstate earnings in their final year of service to create a positive performance impression.
Although empirical literature has provided valuable insights into the CEO horizon problem
on the board process outcome, the auditor’s reaction to the retiring CEO’s wealth-
maximisation incentive through earnings manipulation in publicly held family companies is
still open to debate in the auditing research. As noted in auditing literature, the demand for
auditing is as a result of information asymmetry between the managers and the owners
(Abdulmalik et al., 2016). Therefore, the independence of the external auditor is key to the
quality of the audit service rendered. However, previous audit market studies have observed
that the competition in the audit market contract could serve as a threat to the auditor’s
independence. For instance, a CEO of a retiring auditee firm with full information of
competitiveness of the audit market could entice the auditor to hide unfavourable
information to his/her post-retirement benefits or even cause the auditor to misrepresent
vital information to shareholders. As a result, this paper argues that the CEO horizon
problem is an essential consideration for the auditor’s risk assessment, and hence, audit
quality. Therefore, the first research question addressed concerns how the CEO horizon
problem affects the auditor’s risk assessment.
Furthermore, building on the conjecture that family firms are unique, differences still
exist among family firms. The importance placed on the preservation and perpetuation of
the family socio-emotional wealth (SEW), and how this differentiates family firms, has been
highlighted in many prior studies (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Stockmans
et al., 2010). Therefore, the present study argues that the auditor’s client risk assessment will
vary according to the level of CEO attachment to the preservation and perpetuation of the
family SEW. According to Gomez-Mejía et al. (2007), family firms derive more benefit from
the non-economic aspects of their companies. Beyond the financial objectives, family firms




structure of the companies (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). SEW includes identity, family
influences and perpetuation of the family dynasty. Therefore, because of the fear of losing
their SEW, this paper argues that retiring CEOs in family companies should avoid actions
that could diminish the reputation of their firms and engage in acts that signal their
commitment to high-quality reporting practices by ensuring quality audit.
Consequently, this study examines whether the auditor’s risk assessment in relation to
CEO horizon problems varies among family firm based on CEO identity (i.e. CEO affiliation
with family members and CEO equity stake). This study examines the linkage in the context
of the auditor’s risk assessment because the audited financial statement reflects the level of
acceptability of the auditor’s tolerance of CEO earnings-manipulation tendencies
(Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad, 2016, 2019).
By examining the extent of retiring CEO commitments to SEW and the subsequent effect
on the auditor’s risk assessment, this study contributes both to family-business and auditing
literature in two ways. First, the general argument is that high audit quality improves the
credibility of reported figures. However, some inherent company traits can interact to affect
the relationship between audit quality and the credibility of the audit report (DeFond and
Zhang, 2014). A company’s inherent traits represent one of the essential factors considered
by the auditor when assessing perceived client riskiness. The present study provides
evidence for one such innate company characteristic (the CEO horizon problem), which, to
the best of the authors’ knowledge, has received little attention in the auditing literature. The
CEO horizon problem, as argued in the present study, is an inherent company characteristic
that, prior studies have proved, affects the quality of reported earnings, i.e. retiring CEOs
compromise the financial reporting system; hence, the pre-audited financial statement is
likely to be of low in quality, requiring extra pressure to be applied to the auditors. However,
whether auditors are complacent is still open to empirical validation.
Second, this study responds to a call for research to examine family firm characteristics
on various auditing outcomes (Lei and Lam, 2013). This paper provides additional insight
into the relationship between auditor risk assessment and the CEO horizon problem in
family firms. It extends existing literature in auditing (Ho and Kang, 2013; Lei and Lam,
2013) by departing from the agency view adopted in previous literature in explaining the
incentives behind family-controlled firms’ behaviour. Despite prior literature on family
businesses identifying the objectives of family-controlled companies, including both
financial and non-financial objectives (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejía et al., 2007;
Stockmans et al., 2010), this has mainly focused on the financial-objective aspect using
the agency theory to explain family-controlled firm behaviour. Consequently, studying the
characteristics of family companies in the SEW context can help to better understand the
variation among family-controlled companies. Previous auditing research on family
companies has also treated family companies as a homogenous group by considering how
corporate behaviour differs between family and non-family companies.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of prior literature and
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 provides details the sample and research design. Section
4 shows the empirical results, followed by additional analysis in Section 5. Section 6
provides a summary and concluding remarks.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
A comprehensive review of archival studies on auditing research reveals several
inconsistencies and gaps (Hay et al., 2006). As suggested in Hay (2013) and Tee (2018),
research in the field of auditing could further explore the nature of firm ownership and its




auditor risk assessment, which is largely determined by inherent client characteristics and
auditor independence. Auditor’s independence refers to the ability of the auditor to
detect and report anomalies in a client’s financial statement (DeAngelo, 1981). It is the ability of
the auditor to resist client reporting preferences despite threats of disengagement. The present
study examines the auditor’s resistance to client reporting preferences through the firm’s
ownership structure. Within this context, research on family firms appears to be a relevant and
exciting field of inquiry (Hay et al., 2006; Khan et al., 2015; Tee, 2018). Family firms are known
to affect audit demand because of the associated agency cost (Niskanen et al., 2011). In
distinguishing the difference between family and non-family firms, family firm literature
asserts that owners play an important monitoring role, which will subsequently eliminate Type
I agency problem. Further, the entrenchment effect hypothesis posits that family-firm owners
tend to expropriate minority shareholders, thus creating the Type II agency problem (Pazzaglia
et al., 2013). As explained by entrenchment effect theorists, family firms are associated with
weak corporate governance, which makes board monitoring less effective. This creates
information asymmetry between controlling owners and minority shareholders in family firms
(Wang, 2006). Given the information gap between the controlling owners and minority
shareholders, family firms have more incentive to manipulate accounting figures. Hence,
family firms are claimed to be associatedwith lower earnings quality.
However, family firm literature has, in recent years, been characterised by a growing
interest in considering heterogeneity among family firms, measured by the extent of family
involvement according to SEW theory (Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013; Villalonga and
Amit, 2006). SEW theory extends agency theory, using the central tenet that owners of
family firms give more preference to the firm’s non-economic goals rather than the firm’s
economic goals (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Non-economic goals include
the transition of family firms from one generation to another generation, corporate
reputation or identity, the exercise of family influence and financial independence (Gomez-
Mejía et al., 2007). The non-economic goals imposed by family firms are collectively known
as the “affective endowment”. According to Kets de Vries (1993), family owners prioritise
the satisfaction gained from the affective endowment derived from the business over
financial objectives. Accordingly, family firms have an incentive to demand a high-quality
audit because of the intention of the owners in family firms to preserve the family reputation
and sustain the family business over a long period.
2.1 Chief executive officer career horizon and the auditor’s perceived risk
The CEO CH problem has received empirical attention in recent years. Agency cost arises
when the manager’s investment horizon does not align with the firm’s investment horizon.
The non-alignment in the investment horizon leads to the CH problem, which is defined as a
situation where a CEO nearing retirement is motivated to give more attention to short-term
investment that can boost final-year pay and post-retirement benefits rather than the firm’s
long-term value (Ali and Zhang, 2015). Further, a retiring CEO may supplement their short
investment horizon with current earnings manipulation either through real activities or
accrual-based earnings management (Chen et al., 2018). The reason for this relates to the fact
that the managerial labour market accesses the CEO’s ability based on the earnings reported
by the CEO during his or her tenure (Ali and Zhang, 2015). In this context, CEOs will want to
build a strong reputation in the managerial labour market and avoid being labelled as non-
performing, most notably in a situation where the expected or desired performance does not
match up with actual performance (Davidson et al., 2007). Therefore, the CEO’s reputation
concern will incentivise the CEO to engage in opportunistic reporting. Antia et al.’s (2010)




later years during their tenure, consistent with the horizon problem. Similarly, Ali and
Zhang (2015) showed that a CEO’s short horizon is associated with agency cost, lower firm
valuation and information risk.
The present study re-examines the horizon problem through the lens of the auditor’s
assessment of client risk, because the quality of the financial statement is the outcome of a
joint effort between the management and the auditor. At the audit planning stage, the
International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 315, 2009 (International Federation of
Accountants) emphasises the need for the auditor to identify and assess the risk of a
material misstatement by gaining an understanding of the client business and its
environment. Such an understanding will ensure quality service delivery. Therefore, the
amount paid as audit fees reflects the extent and quality of the audit procedures performed
by the auditor, and hence the quality of the financial statement. Most studies (Bliss, 2011;
Hay, 2013) on audit fees model are consistent with the seminal work of Simunic (1980),
which examines the determinants of audit fees. The determinants of a firm’s demand for
quality audit is established to be a function of a variety of factors that capture the auditor’s
risk exposure. The factors, such as firm characteristics and corporate governance
mechanisms, are often used by the auditor to assess the auditee’s/client’s perceived riskiness
(Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad, 2016). From the supply-side perspective, the auditor’s
perceived riskiness of the auditee/client is determined by the amount charged by the auditor
and the extent of audit procedures to be conducted by the auditor. Accordingly, auditors
charge more for a client that is perceived to be associated with high audit risk (i.e. weak
governance and reporting practices) and less for a client with sound governance practices
(Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad, 2016). Therefore, in response to the CEO horizon agency
concern, the auditor’s client risk assessment will be high because of the expectation that
retiring CEOs have the incentive to distort earnings in favour of their post-retirement
benefit. Thus, the following hypothesis is posited:
H1. There is a positive relationship between CEO career horizon and auditor’s risk
assessment.
2.2 Chief executive officer retirement, chief executive officer identity and auditor’s risk
assessment
Most studies on audit quality in the context of family firms assume the agency theory view
of principal–principal relationship conflict, with majority family owners being claimed to
expropriate wealth from minority non-family owners (Ho and Kang, 2013; Khan et al., 2015).
Calabrò et al. (2017) observed and documented that most studies on family firms view family
business as a unique business group, governed by the same ideology, which is distinctively
different from non-family firms. However, recent studies have provided empirical evidence
to the contrary. According to SEW theorists, family firms display different characteristics
determined by the extent of their attachment to SEW preservation. Stockmans et al. (2010)
established the differences between the financial reporting quality of first-generation and
founder-led family firms. Founder-led family firms were found to have higher quality
earnings compared to family firms led by a later generation. This variation is partially
explained by the fact that the concern to preserve family SEW declines because of the
conflict of interest that could arise more generations become engaged in the family firm’s
management. From another perspective, Pazzaglia et al. (2013) established heterogeneity
within family firms by investigating earnings quality variation between firms created and
managed from inception by family owners and those family firms acquired through market




superior reporting quality compared to acquired family firms. The finding is motivated by
the argument that created family firms exhibit a greater sense of identity.
Corten et al. (2015) confirmed that “altruistic feelings” (i.e. consideration for others’ needs)
are high in first-generation family firms but diminish in the subsequent generations. The
role played by CEO on the board is key and, by its virtue, permits the CEO to exert influence
on strategic board decisions and reporting choices. Based on literature and established
theories, this study argues that CEO identity differs significantly among family firms and
can be an essential source of heterogeneity among family firms. Family identity is a strong
consideration in family firms. CEOs with family-affiliation identity might be strongly driven
by the concern to protect SEW, given the physiological feelings that the business is jointly
owned. Family affiliation and equity participation are considered as a medium through
which a CEO can identify with the firm. Specifically, this study posits that CEOs affiliated to
a family member and CEOs with equity in family firms should exhibit greater identification
than CEOs who possess none of these attributes. For instance, CEOs affiliated to family
owners and CEOs with an equity stake in family firms tend to exhibit the physiological
feeling of ownership, which ties their identity to the reputation of the family business. CEOs
affiliated with a family member are in a better position to protect and behave consistently
with the family SEW preference. The alignment of interest protects CEOs identified with the
family firm (identified CEOs) against the risk of being sanctioned for non-performance with
low compensation risk (Pazzaglia et al., 2013). Hence, identified CEOs are motivated to reject
short-term benefits in favour of long-term economic benefits when their career is ending. In
contrast, CEOs not identified with the family firm (non-identified CEOs) have little or no
financial and non-financial ties with the firm. Moreover, non-identified CEOs have a high
incentive to extract benefit from the family firm, because the compensation package is
attached to the CEO’s performance. As such, towards the end of the CEO tenure, non-
identified CEOs might have more incentive to manipulate pay perks in favour of post-
retirement benefits.
Although prior auditing literature has investigated family ownership, little is known
about whether heterogeneity in family firm affects the auditor’s risk assessment in relation
to the CEO’s concern for protecting SEW. For example, Tee (2018) found that family firms
pay high audit fees because of principal–principal agency problems and Ho and Kang (2013)
found that family firms, compared with non-family firms, incur lower audit fees. The
present study further argues that the CEO CH has a significant effect on the auditor’s risk
assessment, depending on whether the CEO can be identified with the family. Even though
the auditor’s perceived risk of clients with retiring CEOs can be high, when the CEO is
identified with the family firm, the auditor’s perceived risk should be lower. The auditor’s
risk assessment, and subsequent auditor effort, is influenced by the client characteristics
(Simunic, 1980). Generally, auditors tend to intensify effort for clients associated with high
audit risk and weak governance structures (Tee., 2018). This is because of the need to
protect the auditor from the reputation loss and risk of future litigation that are associated
with audit failure. Thus, it can be safely concluded that CEO identity might mitigate the
agency cost associated with the CEO CH, thus reducing the overall client risk assessment in
family firms. Therefore, this study posits that the extent of CEO identity, in terms of family
affiliation and/or CEO equity participation, can moderate the relationship between CEO CH
and the auditor’s risk assessment. Thus, this study posits the following hypothesis:
H2. CEO identity negatively moderates the relationship between CEO career horizon




3. Methodology and data
3.1 Data and sample
The sample consists of selected family-controlled companies traded on the Bursa Malaysia
main board during the period 2005-2016. The study adopted the year 2005 because Malaysia
had just fully recovered from the 1997 Asian financial crisis, with partial recovery beginning
in 1999. During the crisis period, many companies could not survive and were delisted from
Bursa Malaysia. Meanwhile, data collection ended in 2016 because of the new Malaysian
Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) issued in 2017. Financial data were collected from
the Thomson Financial DataStream Advance. Data on CEO age, CEO family affiliation,
CEO equity and other control variables were collected manually from the annual reports
downloaded from the Bursa Malaysia website. Consistent with previous studies that have
adopted the audit fees model, family-owned financial firms were excluded because of their
unique operating nature, such as regulation and reporting formats. Consistent with Ibrahim
et al. (2016), the proposed sample of the study was 190 family-owned listed companies
selected through stratified random sampling based on market capitalisation, with the
exception to the financial institutions as mentioned earlier. Stratified random sampling
reduces systematic bias by giving an equal chance of selection to every unit of population.
For family firm identification, the present study followed the definition of Chau and Gray
(2010), Strike et al. (2015) and Amran and Che-Ahmad (2009) using the percentage of shares
held by founding families and their relatives, board of director with at least two family
members as directors and a family member owns at least 10 per cent of the shares.
Information on the board of directors and shareholding analysis were obtained from annual
report, specifically the directors’ biodata, corporate governance section and shareholding
structure. Therefore, any listed companies that meet any of the definitions above are
considered as part of the present study sample. For instance, Adventa Berhad is a family-
controlled company and among the sampled firms. The selection of Adventa Berhad was
based on the fact that the Managing Director/CEO is the son of a major shareholder. At the
same time, the managing director has substantial shares in the company.
The sample description based on year and sector classification is provided in Table I.
Family firm-year ranges from 182 (construction), 307 (consumer), 601 (industrial product), 36
(IPC), 291 (plantation), 321 (properties), 107 (technology), and 218 (trade and service). Based
on this information, an unbalanced panel data set of 2,063 firm-year observations (190 firms)
was obtained.
3.2 Model and variable measurement
Consistent with prior studies on audit quality (Asthana et al., 2018), equation (1) was used to
estimate the association between CEO horizon, family heterogeneity and audit quality:
CRit ¼ b 1L1  CRit þ b 2CHit þ b 3FMCEO*CHit þ b 4CEOOWN*CHit
þ b 5FMCEOit þ b 6CEOOWNit þ b 7SIZEit þ b 8AUDCOMPLXit
þ b 9LEVit þ b 10LAGWCAit þ b 11LOSSit þ b 12GROWTHit þ b 13CASSETit
þ b 14ROAit þ b 15BIG4it þ b 16CFFOit þ b 17AUDITORCHGit þ b 18INDUMit
þ b 19YRDUMit þ « it (1)
Equation (1) was estimated using the two-step general method of moments (GMM) as




for unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity and the influence of past performance on the
firm’s present decisions (Wintoki et al., 2012). For instance, there are several unobservable
factors such as skills and expertise of audit team members, work allocation, reliance on
internal audit and quality of client financial reporting system which have significant
influence on the client risk assessment but difficult to control for them because of data
availability (Asthana and Boone, 2012). Furthermore, past events determine the auditor’s
current year client risk assessment because the auditing standard requires the auditor to
rely on previous professional judgement (Antle et al., 2006).
Therefore, GMM estimation technique is appropriate because the estimation
technique creates the first difference variables and the lagged value of the dependent
variable, which then removes the unobserved effect (Arellano and Bover, 1995). In the
presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in error term, the GMM
estimation approach is more efficient than the two-stage least square (Arellano and
Bover, 1995). Basically, under panel data application, the unobserved heterogeneity
correlates with the observed covariate, which is then corrected for using the fixed
effect or within the estimator. The fixed-effect estimator assumes that the time-
varying errors have zero means, constant variance and zero correlation (i.e.
exogeneity assumption). The GMM estimation technique that Hansen (1982)
introduced is a non-parametric approach used to estimate model parameters with no
data distributional assumptions, which is an important assumption under the two-
stage least squares regression analysis.
3.3 Measuring the auditor’s risk assessment
The auditors’ risk assessment of the client in the present study was measured by the
amount paid as audit fees by the client and the quality of reported figures. The choice of
audit fees is explained by the fact that audit fees capture the level of the auditor’s effort
and expected future loss (Bell et al., 2001). At the planning stage of the audit, the client’s
business risk and financial reporting risk are profiled by the auditor as major
consideration, which is factored into the auditor’s pricing decision. The quality of
reported figures was also chosen as a measure of the auditor’s risk assessment because
the earnings manipulation risk of the client is another factor that can capture perceived
Table I.
Sample description
based on year and
sector classification
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
2005 15 21 43 3 21 26 7 16 152
2006 15 24 48 3 22 26 9 17 164
2007 15 25 48 3 23 26 9 17 166
2008 15 25 48 3 24 26 9 17 167
2009 15 24 50 3 24 26 9 18 169
2010 15 26 51 3 25 25 9 17 171
2011 14 26 52 3 24 27 8 18 172
2012 14 28 53 3 26 27 9 19 179
2013 16 28 54 3 26 28 8 20 183
2014 16 27 53 3 26 28 10 20 183
2015 16 27 52 3 25 28 10 20 181
2016 16 26 49 3 25 28 10 19 176
Total 182 307 601 36 291 321 107 218 2,063
Notes: 1 = construction, 2 = consumer, 3 = industrial product, 4 = IPC, 5 = plantation, 6 = properties, 7 =




client risk. The choice of discretionary accrual is consistent with prior studies (Asthana
et al., 2018) that have suggested that the financial statement represents the outcome of
the joint negotiation between the management and the auditor. Discretionary accruals
were estimated using Jones’s (1991) modified performance-adjusted model, as adopted
by Asthana et al. (2018). The estimated model is presented as follows:
TAC=At1 ¼ b 0 1=At1½  þ b 1 DREV DREC½ =At1 þ b 2 PPE=At1½ 
þ b 3ROAþ « (2)
where TAC represents the total accruals, i.e. net income before extraordinary item plus
depreciation, and amortisation items minus cash flows from operation scaled by assets in
year t  1; DREV has changed sales from period t  1 to t scaled by lagged total asset;
DREC is the change in account receivables from period t 1 to t scaled by lagged asset; PPE
is the gross property, plant and equipment; and ROA is the return on assets. Consistent with
Asthana et al. (2018), the residual from equation (2) is the estimated discretionary accrual
(TAAC), which represents audit quality.
3.4 Measuring career horizon
Consistent with Strike et al. (2015), CH was measured for each of the CEOs by deducting
the CEO’s current age, obtained in the directors’ profile using the company annual report
retrieved from the Bursa Malaysia website, from the age of 70 years. The age of 70 years
was chosen as the retirement age because, according to the Malaysian Companies Act
2016, directors above the age of 70 years are prohibited from holding companies in any
public company or subsidiary company. As directors holding office in listed companies
must retire after three years (Amran et al., 2014), an additional five years was used to
capture the full effects of the directorship that have their tenure extended beyond the
statutory period.
Ocasio (1994) established a link between CEO age and the horizon problem, suggesting
that CEO’s turnover rate increases with age.
To test for heterogeneity within family firms, CEO identity was used to capture the
differences among family firms. CEO identity was measured by CEO family member
affiliation (FMF), measured using a dummy variable 1 for CEOs who are affiliated to family
members, otherwise zero; and CEO equity stake (CES), i.e. the percentage of the shares held
in the name of the CEO.
3.5 Control variables
With regards to control variables, this study controlled for potential inherent firm
characteristics that could affect audit quality. The control variables are defined in Table II.
Specifically, prior studies have controlled for client size, complexity, inherent risk and
profitability. The present study controlled for client size using the natural log of total assets
(SIZE) as prior studies have found that the auditor’s assessment of client risk varies with
auditee size (Asthana et al., 2018). The sum of accounts receivable and inventories scaled by
total asset (AUDCOMPLX), leverage (LEV) and current asset to total asset (CASSET) were
included in the study’s model to control for auditor workload, client engagement risk and
complexity. Prior studies have shown that the innate firm characteristics will influence the
auditor’s risk assessment (DeFond and Zhang, 2014; Khan et al., 2015). Also, variables loss
(LOSS), lag of working capital (LAGWA), change in sales (GROWTH), return on asset




potential effect of client financial states and performance. Companies in financial distress or
poorly performing companies are likely to lead to going-concern problems and financial
pressure. Accordingly, there is an expectation that the auditor will carry out more audit
procedures (Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad, 2017; Asthana et al., 2018; Hay et al., 2006).
Finally, the study controlled for auditor characteristics by including audit firm size (BIG4)
and auditor change (AUDITORCHG). BIG4 auditors are associated with high-quality audit
because prior studies have shown that the auditor’s attributes determine the quality of audit







CR We use two measures for the auditor’s perceived
client risk. The audit fee is measured as fees paid by
a firm to the auditor for audit service and absolute
discretionary accruals
Asthana et al. (2018)
Explanatory variables
CH CEO career horizon measured as the difference
between CEO age and CEO statutory retirement age
Strike et al. (2015)
FMCEO*CH Interaction term
CEOOEN*CH Interaction term
FMCEO Family CEO is measured as a dummy variable equal
1 if the CEO of a firm is a family member or
otherwise 0
Gomez-Mejía et al. (2007);
Stockmans et al. (2010)
CEOOWN CEO ownership is measured by the percentage of
shares held by the CEO
Stockmans et al. (2010)
Control variables
Size The natural log of asset measures firm size Asthana et al. (2018), Hay
et al. (2006)
AUDCOMPLX Audit complexity is measured by taking the sum of
account receivables and inventories scaled by total
assets
Hay et al. (2006), Khan et al.
(2015)
LEV Leverage is measured by the ratio of total debt to
total assets
Khan et al. (2015)
LAGWCA Lagged working capital Hay et al. (2006)
LOSS A dummy variable that has a value of 1 if a firm’s
net income is negative and 0 if otherwise
Hay et al. (2006)
GROWTH Percentage change in sales from previous year Hay et al. (2006)
CASSET Current asset over total assets Hay et al. (2006)




BIG4 A dummy variable which equals 1 if the auditor is
one of the BIG4 and 0 otherwise
Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad
(2016)
CFFO Cash flow from operation Hay et al. (2006)
AUDITORCHG 1 if there was auditor change in in the previous two
years, 0 if otherwise
Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad
(2016)
INDUM Industry dummy Asthana et al. (2018)






Tables III and IV present the descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study.
Table III provides descriptive statistics for the full sample, whereas Table IV provides the
difference of mean tests between CEOs who were affiliated to a family member and those
who were not affiliated. In Table III, the mean and median for absolute discretionary
Table III.
Descriptive statistics
for the full sample
(n = 2,063)
Variable Mean SD Median 0.25 0.75
Variable distribution
Dependent variables
ABSTAAC 0.074 0.067 0.06 0.02 0.11
AF (thousands of ringgit) 353.5 658.70 155.50 90.00 318.20
Test variables
CH 18.93 9.69 19.00 13.00 25.00
CEOWN 1.09 4.60 0.02 0.00 45.47
FMCEO (dummy variable) 0.45 0.50 0
Client-specific control variables
SIZE (RM, thousands) 2,500 7,900 450 190 1300
AUDCOMPLX 0.30 0.22 0.28 0.14 0.42
LEV 0.23 0.37 0.20 0.05 10.18
LAGWCA (thousands of ringgit) 4,600 62,000 16.721 4260 169.508
LOSS (dummy) 0.17 0.38 0.00
GROWTH 0.20 0.79 0.05 0.10 0.22
CASSET 0.49 0.24 0.46 0.31 0.66
ROA 32.34 190.74 0.62 0.29 0.96
BIG4 (dummy) 0.65 0.48 1.00 0.00 1.00
CFFO 1.99 17.8 0.05 0.01 0.11




FMCEO (n = 921) NON-FMCEO (n = 1,142)
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Difference in
means t-values
ABSTAAC 0.0747 0.0684 0.0749 0.0666 0.0002 0.0827
AF (thousands of ringgit) 5.2954 0.9649 5.0100 1.3104 0.2853 5.5122
CH 18.288 10.023 19.514 9.0202 1.2252 2.9179
SIZE (thousands) 13.299 1.4492 13.156 1.6005 0.1438 2.1160
AUDCOMPLX 8.6452 58.594 9.7190 56.439 1.07383 0.4222
LEV 0.2624 0.4919 0.2092 0.2132 0.0532 3.2882
LAGWCA (thousands of
ringgit) 8,667 92,000 1375 13,900 7,292 2.6300
LOSS (dummy) 0.1683 0.3743 0.1716 0.3772 0.00333 0.2002
GROWTH 1.3913 11.799 1.1883 8.9289 0.2031 0.4448
CASSET 0.4649 0.2324 0.5024 0.2516 0.03741 3.4687
ROA 27.951 197.66 35.885 184.98 7.93444 0.9393
BIG4 (dummy) 0.6938 0.4612 0.6112 0.4877 0.0826 3.9181
CFFO 0.9713 14.459 2.8027 20.065 1.83142 2.3254
AUDITORCHG 0.0532 0.2246 0.0473 0.2123 0.00592 0.6133




accrual (ABSTAAC) were 0.074 and 0.06, respectively. The mean and median for audit
fees (AF) audit fees paid to the auditor were 353,500 and 155,500 ringgit, respectively.
For the test variables, the mean of CEO CH was 18.93, indicating that, on the average,
the number of years the CEO served in the firm was 19 years. On the average, CEO
equity ownership (CEOWN) was 1.09, whereas the average number of CEOs with
family affiliation was 45 per cent of the sampled population. Concerning client-specific
control variables, the average size of the firms measured by log of total asset in RM was
2,500,000 with a median value of RM450,000. The mean of the sum of inventory and
receivable scaled by total assets (AUDCOMPLX) was 0.30 on average. Leverage (LEV)
had an average value of 0.23. The lagged working capital (LAGWCA) was RM4,600,000
and, on average, 17 per cent of the firms in the study’s sample experienced losses
(LOSS). The mean and median of GROWTH were 20 and 0.05 per cent, respectively, and
the ratio of current asset to the total asset (CASSET) on average was 0.49. The firm’s
return on asset had a mean and median value of 32.34 and 0.62, respectively. On
average, 65 per cent of the sampled firms were audited by BIG4 audit firms, whereas the
mean value of the firms’ operating cash flow (CFFO) was 1.99. About 5 per cent of the
sampled firms changed audit firm during the sampled period.
Table IV presents results of the univariate comparisons of all variables based on firms
with CEOs affiliated with a family member and non-family members. The mean and
standard deviation (SD) values for absolute discretionary accrual (ABSTAAC) for CEOs
affiliated with family member of 0.0747 and 0.0684, respectively, were not significantly
different from those for CEOs not affiliated to a family member (0.0749 and 0.0666,
respectively). For audit fees (AF), the mean and SD values for family-affiliated CEOs (5.2954
and 0.9649, respectively) were significantly higher than those for firms with CEOs who were
not family-affiliated (5.0100 and 1.3104, respectively). On the average, family-affiliated
CEOs’ length of service (CH) (18 years) was slightly below that of non-family-affiliated CEOs
(20 years).
Table V displays the correlation matrix, from which it can be seen that the
correlation values are within the acceptable threshold, because all the variables were




Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. AF 1.00
2. CH 0.07 1.00
3. CEOWN 0.00 0.05 1.00
4. FMCEO 0.01 0.06 0.17 1.00
5. LOSS 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.01 1.00
6. BIG4 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.14 1.00
7. LAGWCA 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.02 1.00
8. ROA 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.07 1.00
9. CASSET 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.25 0.85 1.00
10. AUDITOCHG 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.02 1.00
11. GROWTH 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00
12. SIZE 0.51 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.18 0.27 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.02 1.00
13. AUDCOMPLX 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.93 0.90 0.01 0.02 0.11 1.00
14. LEV 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.01 1.00





The study examines the effect of CEO CH in family firms on the auditor’s risk assessment
measured by two variables (discretionary accruals earnings management and audit fees).
The regression results are presented in Table VI, using two measures to capture the
auditor’s perceived client risk: absolute accrual earnings quality (ABSTAAC); and a log of
audit fees (LOGAF). Columns 1 and 2 present the regression results obtained using the
ABSTAAC to measure the auditor’s perceived client risk. Column 1 shows the results for the
direct relationship, while Column 2 shows the results for the interacted terms. Columns 3
and 4 present the regression results obtained for LOGAF as a measure of audit quality.
Column 3 shows the results for the direct relationship, while Column 4 shows the results for
the interacted terms.
H1 predicted a positive relationship between CEO CH and the auditor’s risk assessment.
Consistent with this prediction, the CEO CH variable (CH) in Columns 1 and 2 in Table VI
was significant and positive (b = 0.0062, t = 7.26; b = 0.0061, t = 4.40). This result suggests






















L1.AQ 1.0544 (16.33***) 0.3128 (20.87***) 0.2547 (12.18***) 0.7186 (74.96***)
CH (H1) 0.0062 (7.26***) 0.0114 (10.23***) 0.0061 (4.40***) 0.0080 (3.45***)
FMCEO*CH
(H2)
0.0096 (6.30***) 0.0047 (1.66*)
CEOOWN*CH
(H2)
0.0002 (3.08***) 0.0007 (4.23***)
FMCEO 0.0517 (1.03) 0.2139 (4.72***) 0.0984 (1.80**) 0.1089 (1.39)
CEOOWN 0.0041 (1.61*) 0.0054 (2.89***) 0.0069 (4.69***) 0.0167 (4.30***)
SIZE 0.0500 (2.31***) 0.0654 (10.58***) 0.8537 (33.66***) 0.2769 (29.78***)
AUDCOMPLX 0.0019 (4.26***) 0.0000 (7.80) 0.0072 (3.31***) 0.0020 (2.51***)
LEV 0.0068 (0.18) 0.1189 (6.67***) 1.2891 (8.77***) 0.0607 (1.84**)
LAGWCA 0.000 (1.36) 0.1530 (3.23***) 0.0000 (1.13) 0.2440 (1.40)
LOSS 0.0106 (0.58) 0.0301 (4.17***) 0.1515 (3.19***) 0.0095 (0.56)
GROWTH 0.0017 (0.33) 0.0326 (15.94***) 0.1294 (11.52***) 0.0099 (1.79**)
CASSET 0.0006 (2.91***) 0.0000 (1.33) 0.0023 (1.35) 0.0020 (3.20***)
ROA 0.0001 (0.41) 0.0000 (1.20) 0.0014 (3.21***) 0.0020 (2.82***)
BIG4 0.1224 (4.03***) 0.0850 (13.18***) 0.1532 (3.63***) 0.1475 (5.07 ***)
CFFO 0.0004 (0.87) 0.0002 (0.78) 0.0019 (1.23) 0.0126 (3.12***)
AUDITORCHG 0.0122 (0.80) 0.0411 (11.15***) 0 0.18703 (5.35***) 0.0602 (6.04***)
INDUM YES YES YES YES
YRDUM YES YES YES YES
AR2 0.07 0.081 0.127 0.560
SIG F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
POOLED
OBSERVATION
2,063 2,063 2,063 2,063
Notes: The t-values are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. “YES” in the year dummy
column indicates that the study controlled for year effect; however, the result was not reported consistent
with previous studies (Chen et al., 2018). The L1.AQ is the lagged value of the dependent variable that is
automatically added in STATA to account for any dynamic endogeneity present in the regression. The first
measure used for audit quality is the absolute value of accrual earnings management, whereas the second




firms with a CEO horizon problem increased accruals earnings management by
approximately 0.0062 per cent and this, in turn, led to a 0.0061 per cent increase in the audit
fees charged by the auditor as evidence of the auditor’s perceived riskiness of the client.
H2 predicted that CEO identity could reverse the horizon problem in family firms,
leading them to be assessed as less risky by the auditor. Supporting this hypothesis, the first
interacted term, i.e. FMCEO*CEO, used to measure CEO identity in Columns 2 and 4 in
Table VI, was significant and negative (b = 0.0096, p = 6.30; b= 0.0047, p = 1.66).
This finding suggests that in family firms, CEOs who are affiliated to family members are
less likely than CEOs who are not affiliated to a family member to exhibit the CH problem.
The results shown in Column 2 suggest that CEO family affiliation will reduce ABSTAAC
by 0.0096 per cent and, subsequently, a reduction of about 0.0047 per cent in audit fees, as
shown in Column 4 of Table VI. This finding underscores the fact that the assessed riskiness
of family firms with CEOs who are affiliated to family members is low, compared to family
firms that have CEOs who have no affiliation with any family member.
Further, the results for the second interacted term, i.e. CEOOWN * CH, used to measure
CEO identity, was consistent with the predicted hypothesis. The coefficient of CEOOWN *
CH in Columns 2 and 4 of Table VI was significantly negative (b =0.0002, p=3.08; b =
0.0007, p =4.23). This finding suggests that, in family firms, CEOs with an equity stake
are less likely than CEOs without an equity stake to exhibit the CH problem. The results
shown in Column 2 suggest that CEO equity will reduce ABSTAAC by 0.0002 per cent and,
subsequently, a reduction of about 0.0007 per cent in audit fees, as shown in Column 4 of
Table VI.
Some of the control variables in both models were significant. The coefficient of firm size
(SIZE) was positive and significant in the ABSTAAC and LOGAF models (b = 0.0500, p =
2.31; b = 0.8537, p = 33.66). This result is consistent with the argument that auditors
perceive the risk associated with large firms to be high. For audit complexity
(AUDCOMPLX), the coefficients revealed a negative but significant coefficient in the
ABSTAAC model (b = 0.0019, p = 4.26). The coefficient on CASSET was significantly
positive in the ABSTAAC model (b = 0.0006, p = 2.91). Leverage coefficient was negative
and significant in the LOGAF model (b =1.2891, p =8.77), whereas it is not significant
in the ABSTAAC model. Leverage (LEV) and loss (LOSS) were significantly negative in the
LOGAFmodel (b =1.2891, p =8.77; b =0.1515, p =3.19) but not in the ABSTAAC
model. In the ABSTAAC and LOGAF models, the sign of the coefficient for ROA was
negative, but only significant in the LOGAF model (b =0.0014, p = 3.21). This result is
an indication that the auditor’s perceived risk for firms with good performance is low. The
coefficient for GROWTH was significantly positive in the LOGAF model (b = 0.1294; p =
11.52). The coefficient for BIG4 was significantly negative in the ABSTAAC model (b =
0.1224, p = 4.03) and significantly positive in the LOGAF model (b = 0.1532; p = 3.63).
Finally, the coefficient on auditor change (AUDITORCHG) was significantly positive (b =
0.18703; p = 5.35). All signs for all control variables were as expected and consistent with the
argument in prior studies (Hay et al., 2006; Khan et al., 2015).
5. Discussion
Despite several motivations to study the CH problem, the findings of existing studies are
mixed. This study revisits the horizon problem by investigating the effect of CEO CH on the
auditor’s risk assessment of the client and how CEO identity moderates the relationship in
family firms. Overall, the findings from a longitudinal sample of 2,063 family firm-year
observations between 2005 and 2016 were impressive, with empirical results supporting the




risk assessment (audit quality) revealed that CEO CH has a positive relationship with
accruals earnings quality and audit fees. The results indicate that the CEO CH poses a
severe concern for the auditor’s risk assessment. However, the study’s findings also show
that CEOs’ affiliation with owners of the family company and CEOs with an equity stake
could attenuate the CEO CH problem. This finding is consistent with SEW arguments that
family CEOs and CEOs with an equity stake derive a sense of self-identity with the company
(Martin et al., 2016). The present study found support for H1, i.e. that the CEO CH is an
important consideration when assessing the risk of material misstatement in a client’s
financial statement, as highlighted in ISA 315. The findings support the theoretical
argument that CEO retirement raises agency concerns. This is because the investment
horizon of retiring CEO does not align with the firms’ long-term investment strategy (Ali
and Zhang, 2015). Therefore, non-alignment of investment options between the firm and the
retiring CEO will cause the CEO to manipulate reported figures for a favourable post-
retirement benefit (Antia et al., 2010). Since one of the concerns of the auditor is to
understand the risk associated with the audit engagement, the agency problem caused by
CEOs nearing retirement will make the auditor assess the client’s perceived risk to be high
(Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad, 2016; Gul et al., 2003).
Furthermore, the study also postulated, and found support for, the reversal of the
relationship between CEO CH and the auditor’s perceived client risk. Specifically, the study
found that the interaction between the CEO CH and the retiring CEO’s affiliation to family
members reduced the perceived risk that auditors attached to the risk associated with CEO
CH. It was also found that the CEO CH is of less of concern when the retiring CEO has an
equity stake in the family firm, resulting in the auditor’s perceived risk assessment being
low. The findings are consistent with the SEW theorists, despite the unique nature of family
firms where differences still exist among them (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2011). The differences among family firms exist based on the level of individual firms’
attachment to SEW. Family firms with a strong commitment towards SEW exhibit a high
sense of identification. The “altruistic feelings” (Corten et al., 2015) expressed by an
identified CEO will discourage him or her from engaging in an acts that will possibly bring
disrepute to the name of the family firm. Accordingly, identified CEOs nearing retirement
are less likely to engage in opportunistic reporting, because identified CEOs have a long-
term attachment to family firms. Therefore, because identified CEOs are less likely to
manage earnings towards the end of their tenure, the auditor’s risk perception of such clients
is less than that of clients with non-identified CEOs.
The theoretical and empirical analyses expounded in the current study shed more light
on the CEO CH problem and, therefore, make the following contributions to auditing
research. Although there is some literature on auditing that has explored the supply and
demand of audit service, the area is yet to be fully explored. Overall, this study extends the
CEO CH problem in family businesses within the auditing literature using SEW theory.
Audit research on family firms has previously tended to used agency theory to explain the
motivation regarding the supply and demand for audit service (Ho and Kang, 2013; Tee.,
2018). Prior studies have portrayed family firms as having less incentive to hire high-quality
auditors as a result of the severe Type II agency problems. Therefore, this makes auditors
perceive the risk associated with family firms to be high. Similarly, existing studies (Ali and
Zhang, 2015; Chen et al., 2018; Davidson et al., 2007) on CEO CH have established that the
behaviour of retiring CEOs creates severe agency problems.
The uniqueness of individual family firms, as regards to the extent of CEO attachment to
family firm SEW, has previously been largely ignored in audit research. By comparing




motivation towards retirement and the effect on the auditor’s associated assessment of
perceived risk. The results of this study show that CEO identity can attenuate the CEO CH
problem; hence, the auditor’s perception of client risk will be low. This study, therefore,
contributes to the broader literature on the CEO CH in the auditing literature by identifying
the importance of CEO identity in influencing firm reporting outcomes. Further, the study
contributes to family-firm research on CEO identity. The findings have proven that
differences among family firms concerning CEO identity differentiate family firms, hence
affecting auditor pricing decisions. CEO identity decreases the negative effect of the CEO
CH. This is because CEO identity has a natural affinity with family firms, and this makes
the interest of the CEO and family firms overlap (Calabrò et al., 2017). Therefore, identified
CEOs nearing retirement avoid self-serving decisions that maximise individual wealth,
prioritising instead the long-term firm benefits of the family firms, because they will as well
benefit from the future wealth of the company. By implication, auditors assess the risk of
misstatement in family firms with identified CEOs to be less severe.
6. Conclusion
The study observed auditor risk assessment in relation to the CEO CH problem and further
tested for mitigating the effect of identified CEOs as explained by SEW theory. The study’s
empirical result reveals that, near the retirement time, CEOs in family firms are perceived as
constituting a high risk. However, CEO identity attenuates the problem of the CEO CH. This
study further confirms that differences exist among family firms. Therefore, there might be
a need for future regulations that take care of the specific need of the family-controlled firms
as the present study just revealed that the SEW theory better explains the actions of agents
and principal in family-controlled firms. The findings of the study serve as an
enlightenment to policymakers such as Bursa Malaysia and Security Commission that,
within the family-controlled firms, differences still exist; therefore, there might be a need for
future regulatory initiative to cater for the specific need of family-controlled firms. The need
for family firm-related regulatory actions is essential because the non-financial goals which
primarily drive the existence of family firms might not necessarily be consistent with the
financial goals of family firms. Hitherto, the agency theory influences the development of
corporate governance regulatory initiatives which many SEW literature disputed as not
reflecting the purpose of family firms. Besides, family firms could benefit from the study’s
findings in gaining an understanding of those factors that could have negative
consequences on their reputation. Accordingly, family firms can respond to those factors as
identified in the present study.
6.1 Limitations and future research
The present study has limitations that can provide a fertile ground for future research.
Although the study attempts to measure SEW using the CEO’s family affiliation to family
firms and the CEO’s equity stake, the generation to which the CEO belongs could also be
examined by future studies. For instance, differences could occur among family-affiliated
CEOs when the CEO is the founder, the son of the founder, or just a close relative. Moreover,
concerning the CEO’s equity stake, the Malaysia Companies Act 2016 limits the number of
shares that can be held by CEOs affiliated to family members; the effect of this regulation is
not captured in the study’s model. Future studies could also consider whether this restriction
has any effect on the family firm’s affective endowment. Finally, other validated measures of
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